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State, Dep’t of Taxation v. Chrysler Grp., 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 29 (May 2, 2013)1
TAX LAW – SALES TAX REFUNDS
Summary
This is an appeal from a District Court order granting Chrysler’s petition for a refund of
sales taxes paid on vehicles which Chrysler repurchased from consumers pursuant to N.R.S.
597.630 (the “lemon” law).
Disposition/Outcome
Reversed. Because neither Nevada’s “lemon” law nor the tax statutes provide for sales
tax refunds to vehicle manufacturers, the Department of Taxation (Department) has no authority
to grant them. In addition, the Department did not violate the Administrative Procedures Act
when it changed its prior policy of granting such refunds since its prior policy was an erroneous
interpretation of the law and the new policy sought only to correctly implement the existing
statute.
Facts and Procedural History
On two separate occasions, consumers purchased new vehicles from a Chrysler
authorized dealership in Las Vegas, NV. At the time of the sale, the dealership collected and
remitted to the state the appropriate amount of sales tax. When the vehicles failed to conform to
Chrysler’s express warranties, Chrysler repurchased the vehicles from the customers pursuant to
the requirements of Nevada’s “lemon” law. Included in the monies refunded to the customer
was a reimbursement of the sales taxes paid. Subsequently Chrysler submitted sales tax refund
requests, in accordance with N.R.S. 597.630(1)(b), with the Department seeking to recover the
sales taxes remitted by the dealership. Although the Department had previously granted such
refunds in similar cases, it denied the refund requests based on advice from the Nevada Attorney
General’s Office that there is no statutory authority for such refunds.
Chrysler filed a Petition for Redetermination. The Administrative Law Judge assigned to
the case granted Chrysler’s petition. Thereafter, the Nevada Tax Commission (NTC) overturned
the Administrative Law Judge’s decision and issued a Notice of Decision denying Chrysler’s
requests. Thereafter, Chrysler filed a Petition for Judicial Review with the Eighth Judicial
District Court in Las Vegas. The District Court held that as a result of Chrysler’s refund of the
full purchase price, and all related taxes and fees, the sale contract was rescinded and thus,
Chrysler was entitled to a full refund of the remitted sales taxes. The Department appealed.
Discussion
Justice Hardesty delivered the opinion on behalf of a three justice panel.2
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By David H. Rigdon.
The case was heard before Hardesty, Parraguirre and Cherry, JJ.

Chrysler asserted that it was entitled to the refund under N.R.S. 597.630 (the “lemon”
law), N.R.S. 372.630 (Nevada’s sales and use tax refund statute), and/or N.R.S. 372.025
(Nevada’s statute governing gross receipts of retailers). The Department argued that none of
these statutes are applicable as they do not explicitly authorize a refund of sales taxes to a vehicle
manufacturer.
With respect to N.R.S 597.630 (the “lemon” law), the Court concluded that the statute is
silent with respect to whether a manufacturer is entitled to a refund for the amount of sales tax it
reimburses to a buyer. In addition, the Court found that the legislative intent behind the “lemon”
law was to protect buyers who purchase defective vehicles. Refunding a manufacturer for
reimbursed sales taxes does not incentivize them to produce non-defective vehicles.
Accordingly, the Court held that N.R.S. 597.630 does not entitle a manufacturer to a refund of
reimbursed sales taxes.3
The Court next considered the application of N.R.S. 372.630, Nevada’s sales and use tax
refund statute. N.R.S. 372.630 requires that any “excess amount collected or paid must . . . be
refunded to the person [who overpaid the tax].”4 The Court has previously held that Nevada’s
tax refund statutes “permit recovery only where the taxpayer himself has borne the financial
burden of the tax” and that “[i]f the taxpayer making the claim has collected the tax from his
customers, he has suffered no loss or injury, and is not entitled to a credit or refund.”5 In this
case, Chrysler was not the party who remitted the sales taxes to the Department and thus, it
lacked standing to seek a sales tax refund under N.R.S. 372.630.
Finally, the court analyzed Chrysler’s claims with respect to N.R.S. 372.025, Nevada’s
statute governing gross receipts of retailers. Since Chrysler, by its own admission, is not a
retailer as defined by the statute, the Court concluded that it cannot rely on N.R.S. 372.025 in
conjunction with the “lemon” law statute to claim a refund of the sales taxes. Accordingly, the
Court concluded that none of the three statutes relied on by Chrysler entitles a manufacturer to
claim a refund of sales taxes reimbursed to a customer pursuant to Nevada’s “lemon” law and
thus, the District Court erred when it ruled in favor of Chrysler.
Chrysler also argued that the Department violated the Nevada Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), N.R.S. Chapter 233B, when it changed its previous policy that allowed the refunding
of sales taxes to vehicle manufacturers under these circumstances.
An agency violates the APA if it engages in rulemaking without following the APA’s
requirements.6 Generally, before an agency can engage in rulemaking, it must provide notice to
interested parties and give them an opportunity to oppose the proposed rule.7 However, the
Court has previously held that “[t]here is no reason to require the formalities of rulemaking
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The Court also noted that because denial of the sales tax refund is consistent with the remedial purpose of the
statute it does not transform the “lemon” law into a punitive statute.
4
Nev Rev. Stat. § 372.630(1).
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State v. Obexer & Son, 660 P.2d 981, 985 (Nev. 1983).
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Labor Comm’r v. Littlefield, 153 P.3d 26, 29 (Nev. 2007).
7
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 233B.060(1)(a); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 233B.061(1).

whenever an agency undertakes to enforce or implement the requirements of an existing
statute.”8
Given that the Department’s prior policy of allowing sales tax refunds in these
circumstances was an erroneous interpretation of the law, and that the Department sought only to
correctly implement the existing statute, the Court held that the Department was not required to
undertake formal rulemaking and thus, did not violate the APA.
Conclusion
An automobile manufacturer who, in re-purchasing a vehicle pursuant to Nevada’s
“lemon” law, has refunded the sales taxes paid by the customer is not entitled to a refund of
those sales taxes from the Nevada Department of Taxation.
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K-Mart Corporation v. SIIS, 693 P.2d 562, 565 (Nev. 1985).

